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1.  Introduction 
 
eers’ punishment of free riders has 
been shown to represent a powerful 
instrument to induce cooperation in 
public good games (Fehr & Gaechter, 2000) 
and common pool resources (Ostrom, 
Walker & Gardner, 1992). Interestingly, the 
symmetric instrument of rewarding high con-
tributors has exhibited significantly lower 
demand and efficacy in promoting coopera-
tion. This result is robust across experimental 
settings (Dickinson, 2002; Andreoni, Har-
baugh & Vesterlund, 2003; Walker & Hal-
loran, 2004; Sefton, Shupp & Walker, 2006; 
Vyrastekova & Van Soest, 2008). Experimen-
tal subjects emerge - in general - not to elicit 
the option of rewarding cooperators as a de-
vice to drive peers’ behaviour in favour of the 
group, neither altruistic behaviours are sig-
nificantly stimulated by the possibility of be-
ing rewarded. As Offerman (2002) points out, 
“hurting hurts more than helping helps.”  
This note aims at discussing the reasons why 
individuals – in situations of anonymous in-
teraction with strangers – do not decide to 
remunerate pro-social behaviours, whereas 
sanctioning anti-social ones is quite com-
monly used and efficient in its impact on con-
tributions levels. This result is suboptimal be-
cause rewards present both monetary and 
non-monetary benefits. Like sanctions, re-
wards are costly; however, they represent a 
transfer from the rewarder to the rewardee, 
whereas sanctions are costly for both the pun-
isher and the punishee. Furthermore, and cru-
cially, rewards do not induce in the recipient 
negative feelings like the anger and the desire 
of revenge that might undermine the cohesion 
of a group in case of punishment. An institu-
tion where rewards are fruitfully used as in-
struments to promote cooperation could rep-
resent a form of “virtuous” institution that 
rules out any constrictions and threats and 
where interactions occur in a more helpful 
environment. The absence of perverse effects 
and its nature of transfer are the reasons why 
an efficient use of rewards could represent a 
significant improvement in the devices put at 
work to prevent the decay in contributions. 
We believe that a better comprehension of 
this phenomenon could help in detecting the 
conditions where rewards could play a signifi-
cant role.  
In what follows, we address the issue of 
understanding the reasons behind the low 
demand and the ineffectiveness of reward re-
sulting in economic experiments. The eco-
nomic perspective is enlarged with insights 
from cognitive and social psychology. In par-
ticular, we analyse how rewards are perceived 
from a cognitive point of view and how the 
possibility of being rewarded does affect the 
motivations driving altruistic behaviours. 
Two distinct explanations for low demand 
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and ineffectiveness are discussed. On the one 
hand, rewarding is not elicited by subjects be-
cause it does not enable to yell out the nega-
tive emotions that instead can be expressed by 
assigning a sanction. On the other hand, re-
wards are ineffective in promoting coopera-
tion because they are received by subjects 
holding already an intrinsic motivation to 
contribute: the extrinsic motivation built up 
by a reward or a sanction could be differently 
effective if an intrinsic motivation is already at 
work.  
 
 
2. Economic Experiments On Reward 
 
xperimental studies show the emer-
gence of cooperation under condi-
tions that strongly favour egoism. In 
real context of repeated, non-anonymous inter-
actions, unlike any other species, humans co-
operate with non-kin in large groups: this be-
haviour is puzzling from an evolutionary per-
spective because cooperators face individual 
costs to confer benefits on unrelated group 
members. In laboratory experiments, people 
interacting anonymously elicit positive contri-
butions levels that decline as decisions are re-
peated: when given the opportunity to pre-
vent the decay in contributions by costly pun-
ishing non-cooperators, subjects do punish 
even in one-shot interactions. Ethnographic 
data suggest that such altruistic punishment 
helps to sustain cooperation in human socie-
ties (Boyd, Gintis, Bowles & Richerson, 
2003).  
A bunch of studies focuses on the effec-
tiveness of reward as an alternative or addi-
tional device to promote cooperation and 
prevent the decay in contributions. In two-
stage games, a reward  
is an increase in payoffs that a second-stage 
player imposes on a first-stage player, 
whereas a punishment is a decrease in payoff 
at the second stage. Under peculiar condi-
tions, providing subjects with both the oppor-
tunity to reward and to punish results in 
higher efficiency, although more often this 
does not occur. Andreoni, Harbaugh and 
Vesterlund (2003) examine demands for re-
wards and punishments in a proposer-
responder game. The proposer first makes an 
offer to split a fixed-sized pie; the responder is 
given or is not given a costly option of in-
creasing or decreasing the proposer’s payoff. 
The results show substantial demands for 
both punishments and rewards: however, re-
wards alone have little influence on coopera-
tion, whereas punishments have some. When 
rewards and sanctions are combined, the ef-
fect on cooperation is relevant, suggesting 
that rewards and punishments are comple-
ments in producing cooperation. More spe-
cifically, offers exceed the Nash equilibrium 
level in all three treatments and, interestingly, 
this effect is stronger in the rewards treatment 
than in the sanctions treatment. However, of-
fers are highest in the treatment where both 
instruments are available to the responder.  
Sefton, Shupp and Walker (2003) contrast 
the institutions of reward and punishment 
with respect to their impact on cooperation 
and efficiency in the context of voluntary con-
tributions mechanism with linear payoffs. In 
the reward treatment, contributions decrease 
over time reaching a level below the one ob-
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served in the absence of opportunities to re-
ward: the opportunity to reward results insuf-
ficient to sustain cooperation; in contrast, 
sanctions succeed in sustaining public goods 
provision at a level above the one observed in 
the absence of sanctioning opportunities, and 
so sanctioning appears to be a more effective 
mechanism for sustaining contributions. 
However, opportunities to sanction initially 
result in a loss of efficiency, as the direct costs 
associated with sanctioning prevail over the 
effect of increased contributions. The authors 
also observe differences in the dynamic pat-
terns of rewarding and punishing behaviour: 
whereas subjects initially use rewards more 
frequently than sanctions, over time the use of 
rewards declines at a faster rate than the use of 
sanctions, so that in later rounds rewards are 
used less frequently than sanctions. These re-
sults capture the complexities involved in us-
ing a reward system for sustaining coopera-
tion: “one might argue that a successful re-
ward system requires continued use of re-
wards, and those rewards must be in the form 
of transfers from those allocating less to the 
public good to those allocating more. In our 
experiments, however, it was those subjects 
who allocated relatively more to the group 
account who tended to give more rewards” 
(ibidem). The significant decay in rewards 
across decision rounds suggests that groups 
may have difficulty in maintaining a rewards 
system and that subjects seemed to lack a clear 
focal point or consensus in regard to where 
rewards should be targeted. Moreover, re-
wards seem to work only with a critical mass 
of altruistic individuals that contribute in the 
first stage and then reward who contributed in 
the second stage: however, if this is true, there 
would be no need of building an extrinsic mo-
tivation by means of rewarding or punishing 
because it would be effective for people who 
already behaved altruistic. In a similar fla-
vour, Dickinson (2001) studies teams of four 
members in a laboratory environment where 
giving effort towards a “team goal” is cap-
tured by eliciting voluntary contributions to-
wards the provision of a public good. The ef-
ficiency-improving properties of four distinct 
environments is tested: monetary prizes given 
to high contributors versus monetary fines as-
sessed to low contributors, where being high 
or low contributor is defined first in terms of 
absolute contributions and then in terms of 
contributions relative to abilities (called 
“handicapping”). The use of carrot (positive) 
and stick (negative) incentives are methods of 
increasing effort among members of work 
teams. The results show that both carrot and 
stick can significantly increase efficiency (i.e., 
contributions): more specifically, handi-
capped incentives promise the highest effi-
ciency levels and, when handicapping is not 
used, penalties are more effective than prizes.  
Walker and Halloran (2004)’s study in-
volves a one-shot, voluntary contribution 
mechanism and finds that, whereas some sub-
jects are willing to reward and sanction others 
at a private cost, the opportunity to reward or 
sanction is ineffective in facilitating cooperation 
relative to previous experiments in which re-
peated game environment is employed. An-
dreoni, Harbaugh and Vesterlund (2003)’s 
and Sefton, Shupp and Walker (2003)’s ex-
periments present anonymous, strangers 
treatments: however, a reputation effect about 
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peers’ attitude towards cooperation, or at least 
a mechanism of learning about the rules of the 
game, seems to emerge and strengthen the 
role of punishment and, in a lower extent, of 
reward. This effect disappears in a one-shot 
game like Walker and Halloran (2004)’s.  
Vyrastekova and Van Soest (2007)’s work 
studies the effectiveness of costly rewards in 
mitigating excess extraction in a standard 
Common Pool Resource game experiment. 
Two treatments are implemented: in the first, 
rewards are a pure transfer from one player to 
the other (“transfer reward”); in the second, 
the benefits of receiving a reward are higher 
than the cost of providing it (“net positive 
reward”)1. In this perspective, the authors 
suggest an explanation for Andreoni, Har-
baugh and Vesterlund (2003)’s results on re-
ward effectiveness: the difference with the in-
effectiveness emphasized by other experi-
ments’ results might lie in the parameteriza-
tion. In fact, Andreoni, Harbaugh and Vester-
lund (2003)’s study uses either 1:5 sanctions, 
or 1:5 rewards, or both. Vyrastekova and Van 
Soest find that, when the benefits of receiving 
a reward exceed the cost of providing it, the 
use of extraction tokens in the CPR game is 
significantly closer to the social optimum than 
in case of transfer rewards. This difference in 
effectiveness arises due to the difference in 
profitability of receiving rewards (and conse-
quently in the opportunity costs of not receiv-
ing them), and due to differences in who re-
wards whom. When there are positive net 
gains from exchanging reward tokens, estab-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
lishing bilateral exchange by means of reward 
is in the interest of both the players. As sub-
jects who cooperated have no incentives to 
send reward tokens to free-riders, bilateral 
exchange is established among subjects using 
the same number of extraction tokens. This 
represents for free-riders an incentive to de-
crease the number of extraction tokens used 
to attract rewards. Such considerations are ab-
sent when there are zero net gains from ex-
changing rewards, as in the case of the trans-
fer treatment. This kind of analysis is impor-
tant because in many situations, a rewardee’s 
evaluation of a reward is unlikely to be equal 
to the costs incurred by the rewarder. In case 
of rewards taking the form of monetary trans-
actions, this can be due to subjects’ differences 
in income or wealth; in case of rewards taking 
the form of the exchange of goods or services, 
marginal utilities may differ considerably be-
tween individuals.  
Vyrastekova and Van Soest (2007)’s con-
tribution is very relevant in the topic and 
sheds light on the reasons why sanctions are 
generally more effective than rewards. How-
ever, it lacks in investigating explicitly the dif-
ference between sanctions and rewards. Al-
though the role of the parameterization and 
the prize-to-fee ratio are significant, a change 
in the impact ratio has been found to substan-
tially affect the effectiveness of sanctions 
(Carpenter, 2006; Egas & Riedl, 2005) as well. 
As Casari (2007) shows, sanctions are sensi-
tive to parameterization. Rewards behave co-
herently in the same directions: to prove 
lower effectiveness of the rewards, what 
would matter is a relatively higher sensitivity 
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to parameterization that has not been docu-
mented yet. 
 
 
3. The Psychological Literature On 
Positive Reinforcement 
 
sychological studies strongly differ 
from economics in predicting the role 
of rewards versus sanctions. The psy-
chological literature conceives rewards (sanc-
tions) as positive (negative) reinforcements of 
actions. A huge amount of studies within the 
operant tradition (since the seminal work by 
Skinner, 1953 on) has documented that extrin-
sic rewards do shape behaviour significantly.  
Psychological studies on punishment and 
reward are concerned with adaptive learning 
and the contrast between intrinsic and extrin-
sic motivation. Altruistic ad pro-social behav-
iour are forms of conduct that derive from in-
trinsic motivations but that can be stimulated 
by means of extrinsic devices like reward or 
punishment. Four types of outcomes can oc-
cur in operant research (Burgess and Bushell, 
1969): (1) positive reinforcement, i.e. the ad-
dition of an appetitive stimulus to a situation; 
(2) negative reinforcement, i.e. the removal of 
an aversive stimulus from a situation); (3) 
positive punishment, i.e. the addition of an 
aversive stimulus to a situation; and (4) nega-
tive punishment, i.e. the removal of an appeti-
tive stimulus from a situation. The two types 
of reinforcement can be grouped under the 
general label of “reward,” while the two types 
of punishment can be grouped under the gen-
eral label of “cost” (Gray & Tallman, 1987). 
By 1971, hundreds of studies within the oper-
ant tradition had established that extrinsic re-
wards can control behaviour. In fact, when 
administered closely subsequent to a behav-
iour, rewards were reliably found to increase 
the likelihood that the behaviour would be 
emitted again, an effect that persisted as long 
as the reward contingency was operative. 
When rewards were terminated, the likeli-
hood that the behaviour would be emitted 
eventually returned to the pre-reward base-
line. This general finding led to the wide-
spread advocacy of rewards as a motivational 
strategy, and behaviour-change programs 
based heavily on the use of rewards were in-
troduced into a variety of applied settings 
(Deci, Koestner & Ryan, 1999).  
A wide range of studies has explored the 
effects of various types of rewards like tangi-
ble rewards such as money (Deci, 1971; Deci, 
1972a, Deci, 1972b), positive feedback or ver-
bal rewards. Additional studies explored the 
effect of external effects such as classroom 
climates (Deci, Schwartz, Sheinman & Ryan, 
1981) and the combined effect of reward and 
interpersonal contexts (Ryan, Mims & Koest-
ner, 1983). Interpersonal contexts represent 
the social ambience of settings like homes, 
classrooms, work groups and play a role in 
the extent to which people within the context 
feel pressured to behave in a particular way. 
When studied in laboratory experiments, the 
interpersonal climate is usually instantiated as 
the interpersonal style used by the experi-
menter to administer rewards (Ryan, 1982). 
An important work by Miller, Butler and 
McMartin (1969) on social power emphasizes 
the role of reward and punishment as a form 
of social control whose strength and effect de-
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rive from the ability to deliver reward and 
punishment. The authors remark an asymme-
try between reward and punishment based on 
two arguments. First, considerations on no-
tions like exchange (e.g. Blau, 1964), recip-
rocity (Gouldner, 1960) and equity (Adams, 
1964) suggest that reward and punishment 
implemented by high level of power subjects 
should imply distinct (instead of similar) out-
comes due to the fact that high power subjects 
that use reward should reach their goals be-
cause their use of rewards is perceived as al-
truistic and generous. On the contrary, high 
power subjects that exercise their power by 
means of sanctions could have difficulties in 
getting their ends and, if they do, “in their 
case their dessert are aversive stimuli” (Miller, 
Butler & McMartin, 1969). Furthermore, re-
ward and punishment differ in their effect on 
the learning and maintenance of human be-
haviour (Estes, 1944; Skinner, 1953): mild 
punishment seems to be less permanent in its 
effects, is more likely to produce unwanted 
emotional behaviour than does reward and 
the behaviour that it elicits may be hard to 
specify. However, when subject face stochas-
tic punishment or reward, subjective infer-
ences on the perceived probability of being 
punished or rewarded play a role. The huge 
amount of work generated from Tversky and 
Kahneman and their colleagues (e.g., Kahne-
man et al., 1982), suggests that a given prob-
ability of punishment may be a greater deter-
rent against crime than an equal probability of 
rewards for choosing a non-criminal activity. 
This follows since the probability of negative 
punishment for a non-criminal activity would 
be greater, given that success at non-criminal 
activity was a rare event; in such situations the 
stick may be more powerful than the carrot.  
 
 
4.  Discussion 
 
he insights deriving from the ex-
perimental studies and the psycho-
logical investigations reported 
above shed light on the discrepancy in de-
mand and effectiveness between rewards and 
sanctions. In this section, the possible expla-
nations of this phenomenon are presented and 
discussed.  
An explanation for low demand: Motiva-
tional factors. Psychological studies focus on 
the fact that an extrinsic device such as reward 
might undermine intrinsic motivation to co-
operate. As emphasized by Charness (1999), 
recent models of non-pecuniary motives to 
pro-social behaviour can be classified as either 
altruism-based, equity-based, or reciprocity-
based. One explanation is altruism, where 
people care not only about their own material 
well-being but also about the material well-
being of others: an agent is assumed to assign 
a constant weight to the welfare of every 
other individual. Another approach expands 
the altruism principle by incorporating dis-
tributive concerns: these models, known as 
equity or fairness models, one’s regard for 
another person’s monetary well-being de-
pends on the other person’s monetary payoff 
relative to one’s own4. Finally, reciprocity 
theories expand the principle of altruism in a 
different direction, asserting that attention for 
someone else’s payoff depends on how much 
altruist the other is perceived to be: the prin-
T 
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ciple of reciprocal altruism emphasizes the re-
lationship between one’s action and one’s be-
liefs about the intentions of the other agents5.  
4 Current models in this category are Bol-
ton and Ockenfels (1997) and Fehr and 
Schmidt (1997). 5 The leading model in this 
category is Rabin (1993), while Levine (1996) 
offers an alternative formulation.  
These issues of altruism and selfishness 
drive some crucial questions on our evolu-
tionary origins, our social relations, and the 
organization of society. Experimental evi-
dence indicates that, although agents are self-
interested and maximize their earnings, hu-
man altruism is a powerful force. However, 
there is heterogeneity across individuals: eco-
nomic agents are not generally selfish but 
might belong to further types, i.e. be altruists 
or reciprocators. In experiments, different 
player “types” seem to emerge: (1) some sub-
jects are standard selfish maximizers, confirm-
ing that the homo oeconomicus exists; (2) other 
subjects act altruistically, as if they were 
driven by other- regarding preferences; (3) a 
third group of players are willing to non-
strategically punish and/or reward others, i.e. 
are driven by some form of “strong reciproc-
ity”, based on evaluation of the opponent’s in-
tentions (Camerer & Fehr, 2006). It is this in-
teraction between altruist and selfish indi-
viduals that drives human cooperation (Fehr 
& Fischbacher, 2003). The fact of belonging 
to a specific type is related to the presence or 
absence of intrinsic motivations (of being al-
truistic): only altruists have an intrinsic moti-
vation that moves contribution to a public 
good. Following the psychological debate on 
the role of positive, extrinsic reinforcement on 
intrinsic motivations, we argue that a possible 
explanation of the lower effectiveness of re-
ward relies on the fact that rewarding an al-
truistic behavior undermines the presence of 
an intrinsic motivation to altruism. If people 
are altruist and believe that their pro-social 
behavior is interiorly grounded and this 
should be true also for peers, for instance due 
to the importance of a common project, the 
presence of a device that should stimulate 
pro-social behavior could eliminate this feel-
ing towards the project. If a reward is directed 
to pay off altruists, they would probably ar-
gue that there should be some reason not to 
be altruistic. Any spontaneous effort is ruled 
out. On the contrary, sanctions may build an 
(extrinsic) motivation of behaving altruisti-
cally for individuals who have no intrinsic 
motivation and, in absence of sanctions, 
would free-ride. In this perspective, it would 
be interesting to explore more specifically 
whether the ineffectiveness of reward (con-
trasted to sanction) is due to the fact that it 
undermines the intrinsic motivation of a 
purely altruistic choice. Hence, a comparison 
between altruists and selfish/reciprocators in 
their reactions of altruists to reciprocators to 
rewards should be carried out: only altruists’ 
behavior should be affected by such a reduc-
tion in intrinsic motivation.  
An explanation for ineffectiveness: The role of 
emotions. A relevant source of asymmetry be-
tween reward and punishment lies in the type 
and strength of emotions that originate them 
and that they provoke in targets. Fehr and 
Rockenbach (2003) point out that in human 
societies, social order and cooperation rely on 
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both the use of rewards and sanctions, “which 
ensures the compliance of self-  
interested actors, and on the presence of 
people willing to perform altruistic acts”. 
Their experiment present a setup based on 
dyadic interaction in trust game. In each 
round of the experiment two mutually 
anonymous subjects (an investor and a trus-
tee) are involved. First, the investor has the 
chance of choosing a costly trusting action; 
then the trustee is informed about the inves-
tor’s action and can honour the investor’s 
trust by taking a costly cooperative action. If 
the investor chooses a trusting action and the 
trustee responds cooperatively, both players 
increase their monetary payoff, but the trustee 
has the option of not honouring the investor’s 
trust, saving the costs of cooperation but caus-
ing the investor to be worse off. Conse-
quently, if the investor expects that the trustee 
will not honour his trust, he will not choose a 
costly trusting action at the beginning of the 
game. Therefore, the subjects face a dilemma 
because trust and cooperation are advanta-
geous for both subjects but the trustee faces 
the temptation not to cooperate and, there-
fore, the investor is tempted not to trust. The 
main results in Fehr and Rockenbach’s ex-
periments is that sanctions’ effectiveness relies 
on the motivation that has previously driven 
the sanction: whereas altruistically motivated 
sanctions implemented for the benefit of the 
group enhance cooperative behaviour, sanc-
tions that are imposed to enforce an unfair 
distribution of resources have the opposite ef-
fect. Previous research on public goods ex-
periments has shown that altruistic punish-
ment is a highly effective means of enforcing 
cooperation. Sanctions in the public good 
context enhance cooperation only when the 
punishment of free-riders is an altruistic act 
that is considered as morally legitimate, 
whereas rewards should not present the same 
need of being legitimated.  
Offerman (2002)’s experiments present 
simple proposer-responder games that dem-
onstrate that responders are willing to depart 
from own-earnings maximization by reward-
ing more generous proposers or sanctioning 
less generous proposers. The main hypothesis 
tested in this paper is that negative intentions 
provoke stronger reciprocal responses than 
positive intentions. The potential asymmetric 
effect of positive and negative intentionality is 
assessed in the “hot response game”. In this 
game the first mover makes a choice between 
a helpful and a hurtful choice where the help-
ful choice increases the payoff of the first 
mover by less guilders than the hurtful choice 
and increases the payoff of the second mover 
by the same number of guilders. The second 
mover observes the choice of the first mover, 
before choosing between a cool, remunerative 
response and a hot, reciprocal response. Peo-
ple easily feel insulted after a hurtful choice. 
In accordance with this conjecture, subjects 
experience stronger negative emotions when a 
hurtful choice is intentional than when it is 
unintentional. In addition, they show more 
restraint in responding to their emotion when 
the hurtful choice was unintentional. Both an 
increase in the negative emotion experienced 
and a decrease in the restraint of responding 
to the emotion explain the strong effect of 
negative intentionality on the probability of 
reciprocation. Negative intentionality matters 
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considerably more than positive intentional-
ity.  
Over the years, numerous studies of law 
and economics exposed the effect of legal 
sanctions on individual behaviour, whereas 
neuroeconomics studies have been contribut-
ing to indicate that the desire to punish is of-
ten strong and non-strategic, and that it is a 
largely automatic response triggered by emo-
tional forces (see Singer and Fehr, 2005). 
Among others, the positron emission tomo-
graphy has been used to examine the neural 
basis for altruistic punishment of defectors in 
an economic exchange in an experiment 
where subjects could punish defection either 
symbolically or effectively. Symbolic pun-
ishment did not reduce the defector’s eco-
nomic payoff, whereas effective punishment 
did reduce the payoff. Effective punishment, 
as compared with symbolic punishment, acti-
vated the dorsal striatum, which has been im-
plicated in the processing of rewards that ac-
crue as a result of goal-directed actions. 
Moreover, subjects with stronger activations 
in the dorsal striatum were willing to incur 
greater costs in order to punish. These find-
ings support the hypothesis that people derive 
satisfaction from punishing norm violations 
and that the activation in the dorsal striatum 
reflects the anticipated satisfaction from pun-
ishing defectors. This result is confirmed by 
Casari and Luini (2008)’s finding that pun-
ishment is expressive, and individuals do not 
consider sanctions inflicted by peers as a sub-
stitute of their own sanction, although sanc-
tioning is costly.  
They seem to accrue an intrinsic pleasure 
to punish by themselves, and the possibility to 
set out negative emotions by punishing devia-
tors should play a role.  
In this perspective, it would be interesting 
to explore whether the effect of the negative 
emotions in strengthening the efficacy of 
sanctions compared to rewards could be re-
moved by implementing virtuous institutions 
where punishment cannot be used to imple-
ment anti-social behaviours like targeted or 
blind revenge that grounds on negative emo-
tions. This idea is confirmed by Haigner, Ko-
cher and Sutter (2006), who analyze an ex-
perimental public goods game in which group 
members can endogenously determine 
whether they want to supplement a standard 
voluntary contribution mechanism with the 
possibility of rewarding or punishing other 
group members. They find a large and posi-
tive effect of endogenous institutional choice 
on the level of cooperation in comparison to 
exogenously implemented institutions: de-
mocratic participation rights enhance coop-
eration in groups. Moreover, with endoge-
nous choice, groups typically vote for the re-
ward option.  
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